

## CUBA

I. Seizure of refineries presents Cuba with short-term oil shortage, but within one month at most, Soviet Union can be supplying all Cuba's needs.

A. Cuba requires about 1,680,000 barrels of crude per month to meet domestic needs.

3. Effects of shortage on economy could be only local and temporary; if Soviet really steps in--as is likely.

4. Shortages in supply of refined products could develop as result of difficulties in maintaining refineries and obtaining spare parts.

II. Cuban reaction to US sugar law has been quick and violent as expected.

A. Cuban Labor Confederation, Castro's Communist-controlled labor arm, has called for a mass rally protesting "aggression of imperialist and pro-Nazi government of US."

1. Date of rally not yet set.

2. Bitterness being engendered against US so persistently that violent mob action against US property or personnel is possibility.

III. Foreign Minister Roa apparently shortly to be replaced by pro-Communist Carlos Olivares who was named undersecretary on 17 June.

State Department review completed

25X1

- A. Olivares, a member of Raul Castro's clique, is assuming increased responsibilities while Roa remains in background.
1. He recently returned from trip through Latin America roundly condemning US.
  2. He has been one of top organizers for Latin American Youth

25X1 Congress, to open in Havana 26 July under Communist domination.

IV.

25X1

[redacted]  
[redacted] Major Juan Almeida, chief of Cuban army, is to be replaced

shortly by 25-year-old Major William Galvez, now Inspector General.

- A. Galvez is Communist now on way back to Cuba after visiting Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Vietnam.

25X1

- B. During the past month, the Cuban ambassador designate to [redacted]  
[redacted] and the ambassadors to [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] have defected.

25X1

25X1

V. Raul Castro's 15-man party arrived in Prague on 26 June.

25X1

- A. [redacted] Czechs have agreed to provide Cuba with small arms, artillery, and jet aircraft of unknown type.
- B. Rumors in Havana say Raul is also going to visit Moscow to negotiate some form of pact with USSR.
- C. Raul told the Czech press 2 July that it no longer would be disastrous for Cuba if US stops buying Cuban sugar since Cuba now has "the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

VI. Cuba continues to provoke hostility of other Latin American governments.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200070019-7

- A. Most recent incident was with Ecuador.
  - 1. Propaganda-laden Cuban plane landed without permission in Ecuador, provoking strong protests.
  - 2. Ecuador has expelled representative of Havana's Prensa Latina and government has told US embassy that no replacement will be permitted.
- B. Propaganda plane also landed Panama, leading to Panamanian protests.
  - 1. Panama press has strongly condemned Castro regime.
- C. El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica considering joint break with Cuba; Guatemala and Nicaragua have already broken off relations.

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200070019-7

NSC BRIEFING

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14 July 1960

SOVIET POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

I. While Khrushchev continues to assert that the general line of his foreign policy remains unchanged, Soviet actions and statements over the past few weeks indicate an increased willingness to employ sharper tactics against the US and its allies.

A. With the Sino-Soviet dispute temporarily muted at Bucharest, Khrushchev appears to be seizing targets of opportunity and exploiting situations against the US with a new vigor.

1. A TASS correspondent in London recently summed up this attitude privately along the lines that Moscow will continue to "scare the daylights out of America's allies," and not allow the US "a moment's rest until President Eisenhower leaves office."

2. A factor underlying this attitude is probably the Kremlin's view that the US election campaign period provides an opportunity for pressing its anti-American campaign and complicates the problem of coordinating Western responses.

II. There has been a rapid series of new menacing actions and statements by the USSR aimed at discrediting American leadership in the free world and isolating the US from its principal allies at every opportunity.

A. Khrushchev threatened to provoke a Berlin crisis if West Germany holds its parliamentary session in West Berlin this fall, as has been done since 1955.

1. Expectations of Western disunity and differences between

Bonn and Berlin are probably a major factor in Khrushchev's

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25X1

DOCUMENT NO. 6  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS  
DECLASSIFIED  
DATE 01-11-00 BY 1-77-0

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200070019-7

25X1

- 
- B. Khrushchev injected the USSR into the Cuba situation with his warnings that Moscow could employ rockets in defense of Castro.
  - C. Moscow quickly attempted to exploit the Congo situation by charging American aggression in support of Belgium.
  - D. The American and British military missions in East Germany have been subject to constant harassment, probably with Soviet approval.
  - E. Moscow is clearly intent on using the RB-47 incident to agitate the issue of US overseas bases and to offset the impact of the U-2 on the USSR's military posture.
    - 1. While Khrushchev was probably frank in acknowledging that the announcement on the aircraft had been withheld to ensnare the US in a trap, the precise release of the protest notes may have been timed to coincide with the long-scheduled British parliamentary debate on control over US bases.
  - F. The Soviet government has also charged that US aircraft have repeatedly buzzed Soviet ships in international waters and hinted at possible retaliation against US aircraft by the Soviet vessels.
- III. With Moscow shifting the focal point of its operations to the public forum, USSR will make full use of the sounding board provided by UN organs.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200070019-7

- A. There is evidence that Moscow encouraged the Cuban complaint to the Security Council, with a promise of full Soviet support.
- B. Khrushchev cynically admitted that he sees no hope for results on Moscow's own complaint to the UN on the RB-47 but that the action was necessary so as to "discredit once more the dishonest judges, and arouse the indignation of all the world."

25X1

IV. The London TASS correspondent emphasized  that despite these moves Khrushchev still believes that ultimately finding some means of accommodation with the US must be the major objective of Soviet policy.

- A. Khrushchev firmly and definitively reaffirmed his peaceful coexistence line for Bloc leaders at their Bucharest meeting.
- B. He particularly emphasized that only "madmen" would consider resorting to war.
- C. He apparently still believes he can pursue the contradictory line of an all-out anti-American campaign without permanently damaging his chances of reopening negotiations with the West.

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200070019-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200070019-7